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Abstract
We consider evidentials embedded in complement clauses with new data from
Bulgarian. For Tibetan, Garrett has shown that embedded evidentials are always
shifted to the perspective of the reported speech. In Bulgarian, we show that such
a shift is almost never possible. This shows that Bulgarian evidentials should not
be analyzed as modals, but rather as presuppositional.
1 Introduction
1.1 Embedded Evidentials and Shifting
Evidentials are linguistic markers that indicate the speaker’s source of information, e.g.
direct observation, hearsay or inference (Chafe and Nichols 1986, Aikhenvald 2004). It
is often suggested that they do not contribute to the proposition expressed, but operate
on the speech act level. If so, one would not expect evidentials to be embeddable. And
indeed, for many languages it is claimed that evidentials can not be embedded at all:
“A fair number of languages do not have any evidentials in subordinate clauses;
these include Abkhaz, Qiang, Eastern Pomo, Tariana and Jarawa.” (Aikhenvald
2003, 17)
On the other hand, we do ﬁnd isolated examples of embedded evidentials, for example in
Qiang (LaPolla 2003, 75, ex.41), Shipibo-Konibo (Valenzuela 2003, 38, ex.11), Western
Apache (de Reuse 2003, 90, ex.22) and Cusco Quechua (Faller 2006, 6, ex.7b). But the
status of such isolated examples and their semantics often remain unclear. At this point
it is not possible to make cross-linguistic generalizations concerning the embeddability of
evidentials, because most descriptive grammars simply don’t state whether evidentials are
allowed in embedded clauses and what their semantics is.
In fact, we are aware of only one extensive discussion of evidentials in complement clauses,1
namely Garrett (2001, ch.5) on Tibetan evidentials under propositional attitude verbs.
His two main observations for Tibetan are the following:
First, embedded evidentiality is only possible under verbs of speaking (lab ‘to say’,
skad.cha dris ‘to ask’) and thinking (bsam ‘to think’, yid.ches yod ‘to believe’), not other
∗We are very grateful to Penka Stateva and Dora Toneva for patiently thinking through complex
scenarios and sharing the native intuitions with us. We also thank Milena K¨ uhnast for some consultation.
This paper was presented at the Semantiknetzwerk 5 meeting in Berlin, funded by the DFG (grant SA
925/2-1) and at Sinn und Bedeutung 11 in Barcelona, and we thank both audiences for their helpful
comments. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the ﬁnancial support for this work that came from the
German Research Foundation DFG (grant SA 921/1-2 to Uli Sauerland) and from the European Union,
Sixth Framework Program (project CHLaSC).
1McCready and Ogata (2006) convincingly demonstrate that certain Japanese evidentials can be em-
bedded in conditionals and under certain sorts of negation. However, they do not discuss (the semantic
eﬀects of) embedding under complement-taking predicates, which is our central interest in this paper.2 Uli Sauerland and Mathias Schenner
attitude verbs (ha.go ‘to know, understand’, thong ‘to see’, re.ba ‘to hope’). Garrett
(2001, 215) argues that Tibetan evidentials have a performative component that requires
them to occur in assertive contexts, provided by verbs of speech and thought, but not
other embedding predicates.
Second, embedded evidentials are no longer speaker-oriented, as illustrated in (1):
(1) a. yang.chen
Yangchen
dge.rgan
teacher
red
[ind cop]
‘Yangchen is a teacher.’ (Speaker’s source: hearsay/inference)
(Garrett 2001, 13, ex.3)
b. bkra.shis
Tashi
kho
he
dge.rgan
teacher
red
[ind cop]
bsam-gi-‘dug
think-[dir imp]
‘Tashii thinks hej is a teacher.’ (Tashi’s source: hearsay/inference)
(Garrett 2001, 211, ex.7b)
Following Garrett (2001, 4), we call the person from whose perspective a given evidential
is evaluated the evidential origo. If the evidential origo is not the speaker of the actual
speech act, we call it shifted. For example, in (1a), the unembedded case, the evidential
origo is the speaker, while in the embedded case (1b), it is the attitude holder (Tashi).
More generally, in Tibetan, the evidential origo of embedded evidentials is always the
attitude holder. In other words: embedded evidentials are always shifted.
This phenomenon of evidential shift is reminiscent of the phenomenon of indexical shift
(Schlenker 1999, Schlenker 2003, von Stechow 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004). In English,
indexical ‘I’ always refers to the speaker of the actual speech act, even in embedded
contexts (cf. (2a)). In Amharic, things are diﬀerent: If the ﬁrst person pronoun is
embedded under a verb of speech or thought, it can refer to either the speaker of the
actual speech act, like in English, or to the speaker of the reported speech act (cf. (2b)).
In the latter reading, the indexical is called shifted.
(2) a. John said that I am sick.
b. john
John
J¨ agna
hero
n¨ aNN
I-am
yt-lall
says-3sg.m
(Amharic)
‘John says that I’m a hero.’
‘John says that he’s a hero.’
In this paper we investigate whether embedded evidentials in Bulgarian shift and un-
der which conditions. In subsection 1.2 we introduce the basic evidential distinctions in
Bulgarian. Section 2 is devoted to the reportative evidential, section 3 to the dubitative.
Our main results will be: First, predicates diﬀer in whether they allow evidential markers
in their complements (‘say’ and ‘read’ allow them, ‘believe’ and ‘see’ typically don’t).
Second, unlike epistemic modals Bulgarian evidential markers usually remain unshifted,
except in certain contexts. Third, evidential markers can be shifted independently of other
indexical elements in the clause (vs. Anand and Nevins (2004)), but there is a violable
preference to shift the evidential markers together.
1.2 Bulgarian evidential categories
All languages of the Balkan Sprachbund (except Greek) developed evidentiality systems,
presumably under Turkish inﬂuence. Bulgarian (and more generally Balkan Slavic) pos-
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sesses at least three kinds of verbal evidential markers (cf. e.g. Radeva (2003), Friedman
(1986)):
1. direct (dir) (aka conﬁrmative, witnessed)
2. reportative (rep) (aka nonconﬁrmative, renarrative, perfect of evidentiality)
3. dubitative (dub)
In the system of Aikhenvald (2004), Bulgarian is classiﬁed as type A1 Firsthand vs. Non-
ﬁrsthand (ibid., 288, 298), or as type A2 Nonﬁrsthand vs everything else (ibid., 264),
or – probably more accurate and in accordance with our presentation – as A1 with an
A2 subsystem (Friedman 2003, 191). Friedman (2003) distinguishes ‘conﬁrmative’ (cor-
responding to our ‘direct’) and ‘nonconﬁrmative’ (corresponding to our ‘reportative’ and
‘dubitative’). The distinction between reportative and dubitative is not strictly evidential
in nature, since both indicate the same type of source of information (namely indirect ev-
idence), but the dubitative additionally conveys that the speaker has considerable doubts
concerning the truth of the proposition expressed.
The direct is morphologically unmarked and indicates that the speaker has ﬁrsthand
evidence for the proposition expressed. (The same form is also used as a default for
general knowledge.) For example, (3) conveys that the speaker directly witnessed that
Todor has red hair. It would be odd to use this sentence if the speaker has only ever
spoken with Todor on the phone.
(3) Todor
Todor
ima
has.dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘I know from my own experience that Todor has red hair’
The reportative is realized by a verbal suﬃx -l and indicates that the speaker has repor-
tative evidence for the proposition expressed, i.e. somebody told him, as illustrated in
(4).2 Reportative forms are required in free indirect discourse (Radeva 2003, 149).
(4) Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘I was told that Todor has red hair.’
The reportative forms are identical to the perfect form, except in the 3rd person, where the
perfect does not allow auxiliary drop at least in the Eastern dialects (Friedman (1986)).3
In these dialects, (4) is unambiguously a reportative form, while (5) is interpreted as
present perfect.
(5) Todor
Todor
e
be.pres
imal
has-perf
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘Todor has had red hair’
2The same form can also be used to indicate inferential indirect evidence (cf. Izvorski (1997)). However,
we will exclusively focus on reportative readings in this paper.
3One of our informants is actually a speaker of the Soﬁa dialect in the West, but she shared all the
relevant intuitions with our Eastern informant.
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Bulgarian also has a dubitative form, which we will argue has an evidential component.
The dubitative is morphologically realized in a periphrastic form: be+perf and partici-
ple+perf, illustrated in (6). It contributes two meaning components, namely that the
speaker has only indirect evidence for the proposition expressed and that he has doubts
concerning its truth.
(6) Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
have-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘I was told that Todor has red hair, but I doubt it.’
2 The Reportative
2.1 Embedding the reportative
In Bulgarian, evidential distinctions are not restricted to main clauses. At least certain
predicates allow evidentials to occur in their complements. We use constructed scenarios
to control for the evidential origo in the following test sentences. The relevant parameters
for the reportative are the evidential origo (Sp(eaker), Su(bject)) and the type of the
information source (Dir(ect), Rep(ortative evidence)). For example, Dir(Sp) means that
the speaker of the sentence has direct evidence for the embedded proposition.
(7) Scenario types:
Dir(Sp) Rep(Sp)
Dir(Su) (8)
Rep(Su) (9)
If the evidential source of speaker and matrix subject match, as in the shaded cells of
the table, we expect the corresponding evidential marker: dir for  Dir(Sp),Dir(Su)  and
rep for  Rep(Sp),Rep(Su) . The unshaded cells are the interesting cases, where speaker
and subject source don’t match. For embedding under kaza (‘say’), relevent scenarios are
given in (8) and (9).4
(8) Scenario: Maria saw Todor’s hair and tells me “Todor ima ˇ cervena kosa” (Todor
has red hair). I believe her.
a. ? Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
In (8b), uttered in the given context, rep indicates that the speaker has indirect evidence
for the proposition that Todor has red hair, i.e. embedded rep receives an unshifted
interpretation. The relative acceptability of (8a) without reportative morphology, we
believe, reﬂects the use of the direct reporting common knowledge. It seems reasonable for
the speaker to accept Maria’s ﬁrst-hand knowledge as common knowledge. Consequently,
we found that omission of rep is more sharply ill-formed if both speaker and subject have
only indirect evidence.
4All our data has been checked with two consultants independently (Dora Toneva and Penka Stateva).
T h et w os h o wah i g hd e g r e eo fa g r e e m e n t .
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(9) Scenario: Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair and Maria believes her. Maria
says: “Todor imal ˇ cervena kosa.” I saw Todor’s red hair with my own eyes.
a. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. * Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
(9b) shows that the reportative cannot receive a shifted interpretation under kaza. Since
embedded rep is incompatible with a context like (9), where the speaker has direct
evidence for the embedded proposition, we conclude that embedded rep requires a speaker
oriented interpretation. The following table summarizes our ﬁndings for embedding dir
and rep under kaza.
(10) Embedding evidentials under kaza:
Dir(Sp) Rep(Sp)
Dir(Su) dir,*rep ?dir,rep
Rep(Su) dir,*rep *dir,rep
2.2 Semantics of the Reportative
Our semantics of embedding rests on the following basic assumptions: First, matrix and
embedded clauses are predicates of individuals (Lewis 1979). Second, we adopt a fully
extensional treatment of possible worlds (Cresswell 1990, Percus 2000, Schlenker 1999)
with λ-operators in the syntax that bind world variables. The ﬁrst assumption then
entails that both matrix and embedded clauses are always initiated by a set of context
operators binding at least an individual and a world argument. Third, we assume that
indexicals can, in principle, be bound from either the matrix clause (x0 or w0), yielding
the unshifted reading, or the embedded clause (x or w), yielding the shifted reading.
(11) λx0,w0 Maria kaza λx,w evid( , ) Todor ima ˇ cervena kosa
For the purpose of this paper, we’ll use the following semantics of kaza/say:
(12) [[say]](w0)(P)(s)=1i ﬀ∀(x,w): (x,w) fulﬁlls all assertions made by s in w0 →
P(x,w)
Let’s turn to the semantics of rep. There are several proposals for the semantics of
reportative markers in the literature, but none of them predicts the correct readings of
the embedded cases.
Option 1: Modal (Izvorski 1997). Izvorski (1997) analyses the Bulgarian reportative
as a must-like epistemic modal that additionally presupposes that the speaker has indirect
evidence for their claim. If there is no indirect evidence available, it would be odd to use
the reportative marker, as shown in (13b) from Izvorski (1997, 227).
(13) Knowing how much John likes wine ...
a. ... toj
he
trjabva
must
da e
is
izpil
drunk
vsiˇ ckoto
all-the
vino
wine
vˇ cera
yesterday
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b. #... toj
he
izpil
drunk-rep
vsiˇ ckoto
all-the
vino
wine
vˇ cera
yesterday
This contrast can be illustrated with a parallel English example: In the absence of available
indirect evidence, it is possible to use epistemic must (as in (14a)), but it would be odd
to use the evidential adverbial apparently (as in 14b).
(14) Knowing how much John likes wine ...
a. ...he must have drunk all the wine yesterday.
b. # ...he apparently drank all the wine yesterday.
Formally, Izvorski (1997) analyzes the reportative as an epistemic modal with an evidential
presupposition:
(15) The Interpretation of ev(p):
Assertion: p in view of the speaker’s knowledge state
Presupposition: The speaker has indirect evidence for p
The use of a necessity operator in the assertion part seems somewhat counterintuitive,
especially if we think of cases in which the speaker relies on a report from a source that
is not entirely trustworthy. One of Izvorski’s reasons for using the box is that she aims to
develop a common semantics for all uses of the present perfect morphology which include
not only reportative, but also inferential uses. For inferential uses, the analysis in (15)
works ﬁne, but it does not easily extend to reportative uses (cf. Faller (2002, 104–109)
for a detailed discussion of this point).
If we try to apply a modality-based analysis like (15) to embedded occurrences of the
reportative, we face another two problems: First, we would expect rep to shift, because
it is analysed as an epistemic modal and embedded epistemic modals always shift (cf.
Stephenson (2005), Hacquard (2006, 137)), as illustrated in (16). In (16b) it is not the
belief worlds of the speaker that are claimed to entail that it is raining, but the belief
worlds of John.
(16) a. It must be raining
b. John thinks it must be raining
Second, the intuitively plausible assumption in (15) that the reportative contributes to
the assertion leads to severe problems in the embedded cases. (17) means that Maria said
that Todor has red hair. But Izvorski predicts it to mean that Maria said that Todor must
have red hair.
(17) Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
(18) Presupposition: The speaker has indirect evidence that Todor has red hair.
Assertion: Maria said: λx,w  λy,v(Todor has red hair(y,v)) in view of the speaker’s
knowledge state
Option 2: Weak assertion. McCready and Asher (2006) present an sdrt analysis of
Japanese evidentials that is close in spirit to Izvorski’s account, especially for inferential
evidentials. The treatment of reportatives diﬀers in that their contribution to the assertion
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does not contain any modal element. As illustrated in (19), the reportative element soo-
da weakens the assertion considerably: It is only required that there is somebody who
believes the proposition the evidential applies to.
(19) Japanese: soo-da(φ)
a:
π
π :
x
believe(x,φ)
∂:
e
Hearsay-Evidence(e,π)
(McCready and Ogata 2006, 38)
Again, this analysis is plausible for unembedded occurences of the reportative, but as
soon as we try to account for embedded cases, we get into trouble. If we transferred the
analysis to Bulgarian, we would predict the reading in (20) for (17).
(20) Assertion: Maria said that there is some individual who believes that Todor has
red hair
Presupposition: There is hearsay-evidence that Todor has red hair
Clearly, the assertion part is too weak in (20).5 The moral for Bulgarian seems to be:
Don’t let embedded reportatives modify the assertion directly.
Option 3: Illocutionary Modiﬁer. Another analysis of reportative markers locates
their contribution at the speech act level. Faller (2002) analyses reportative Cusco
Quechua -si as an illocutionary modiﬁer. According to (21), the reportative changes
the illocutionary force from assert to present and replaces the sincerity condition that
the speaker believes that p by the condition that there is reportative evidence for p.
(21) -si:
assert(p)
sinc=

Bel(s,p)
  −→
present(p)
sinc=

∃s2(Assert(s2,p) ∧ s2 / ∈{ h,s}

While this analysis is attractive for Cusco Quechua, where the reportative, and evidentials
in general, cannot be embedded, it is problematic for Bulgarian. If analysed as illocution-
ary modiﬁers, along the lines of (21), embedded occurrences of the reportative would have
to take scope over the whole proposition. For (17), we would get the analysis in (22a)
instead of the correct one in (22b).
(22) a. prop: Maria said that Todor has red hair
evid: The speaker has reportative evidence that Maria said that Todor has
red hair
b. prop: Maria said that Todor has red hair
evid: The speaker has reportative evidence that Todor has red hair
5McCready and Ogata (2006) present an alternative account of Japanese evidentials using probabilistic
dynamic predicate logic, but as far as we can tell, the analysis cannot be tranferred to Bulgarian either,
for exactly the same reason.
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Our Analysis. We propose the purely presuppositional lexical entry for rep in (23).
There are two diﬀerences to Izvorski’s entry in (15): First, we replaced reference to
the speaker by variables to handle potential shifting of the evidential origo. Second,
we removed the modal component in the assertion part to get correct predictions for
embedded occurences of the reportative.
(23) [[rep]](y,v)(p)
Presupposition: y has in v reportative evidence for p
Assertion: p
The following binding condition ensures that the reportative receives a speaker oriented
interpretation:
(24) Binding condition:
T h ea r g u m e n t so frep y and v must be bound by the context operators of the
matrix clause.
The examples in (25) have the same presupposition, namely that the speaker has indirect
evidence for the proposition that Todor has red hair.
(25) a. λx0,w0 Todor has-rep(x0,w 0) red hair
b. λx0,w0 Maria said λx,w that Todor has-rep(x0,w 0)r e dh a i r
There is one objection against (23) that immediately comes to mind: Isn’t the assertion
part much too strong? After all, one point of using the reportative is to signal that the
speaker isn’t committed to the truth of p, or at least not to the same degree as if he
uttered the sentence without the reportative.
However, in the embedded case, we need exactly that strong assertion part. Nothing
weaker will do, as our discussion of other analyses has shown. In the unembedded case,
notice that Bulgarian reportative seems to be diﬀerent from Cusco Quechua and Japanese.
In Cusco Quechua (cf. (26a) from Faller (2002, 193)) and Japanese (cf. McCready and
Ogata (2006, 57)) it is possible to assert p-rep and ¬p without contradiction.
(26) a. Pay-kuna-s
(s)he-pl-rep
˜ noqa-man-qa
I-illa-top
qulqi-ta
money-acc
saqiy-wa-n,
leave-1o-3
mana-m´ a
not-surp
ni
not
un
one
sol-ta
Sol-acc
saqi-sha-wa-n-chu
leave-prog-1o-3-neg
‘They left me money, but they didn’t leave me one sol.’
Ev: It is said/They said that they left me money.
b. * Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
no
but
vsˇ aˇ stnost
in fact
kosata
hair.the
mu
his
e
is
ˇ cerna
black
(Attempted:) ‘I was told that Todor has red hair – but in fact his hair is
black.’
In contrast, in Bulgarian the speaker cannot use p-rep if he knows that p is false. Hence
it is not possible to assert p-rep and ¬p at the same time (this is shown in (26b)). If the
speaker wants to express his doubts, it is necessary to use the dubitative marker – the
topic of the next section.
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3 The Dubitative
3.1 Embedding the dubitative
The dubitative indicates indirect evidence and doubt. Morphologically, it is marked by
two occurrences of perfect morphology. We analyze these as two separate components:
rep and dub.
(27) Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
have-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘I have reportative evidence that Todor has red hair, but I doubt that it’s true’
The use of the dubitative in unembedded contexts is described as having an exclamative
ﬂavor (“As if Todor had red hair!”) (Radeva 2003). Embedding the dubitative under
kaza is grammatical. We again use constructed scenarios to control for the evidential
origo in the following test sentences. For the dubitative we need the additional parameter
doubt (Dbt) in our scenarios. For example, Dbt(Su) means that the matrix subject doubts
the modiﬁed proposition in the given scenario. As we will see below, it matters whether
the speaker believes that the subject has direct evidence in the case Rep(Sp), Dbt(Sp),
Dir(Su).
(28) Scenario types:
Dir(Su) Rep(Su) Rep(Su), Dbt(Su)
Dir(Sp) (30)
Rep(Sp)
Rep(Sp), Dbt(Sp) (31)/(32) (29)
The ﬁrst scenario tests whether dub can remain unshifted in embedded contexts. We
take the acceptability of (29c) to establish this.
(29) Scenario: Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair and Maria believes her. Maria
tells me: “Todor imal ˇ cervena kosa.” However, I saw that Todor has white hair.
a. ?* Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. ? Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
c. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
has-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
In this scenario the speaker doubts the information provided by Maria because of conﬂict-
ing direct evidence. Since both the speaker and Maria have reportative evidence for the
embedded proposition, it is clear that the direct cannot be used. The dubitative compo-
nent dub in (29c) has to be speaker oriented, since Maria doesn’t doubt the proposition
that Todor has red hair in the given context.
The next scenario tests whether the dubitative can also shift. The unacceptability of the
dubitative in (30c) establishes that this this is not the case – the dubitative must remain
unshifted.
(30) Scenario: Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair but Maria doubts it. Maria
tells me: “Todor imal cervena kosa.” However, I saw Todor’s red hair, too.
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a. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. * Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
c. * Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
has-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
We conclude that the dubitative component dub cannot be shifted, but has to be speaker
oriented. The next two scenarios show that the reportative rep above dub behaves
diﬀerently from dub itself: The unacceptability of (31c) shows that rep above dub
cannot remain unshifted.
(31) Maria met Todor and saw that he had red hair. Maria then says: “Todor ima
ˇ cervena kosa.” However, I actually played an elaborate trick on Maria: While she
was asleep, I secretly put red contact lenses into her eyes which she hasn’t noticed
yet. So, while I can clearly see that Todor has white hair, Maria perceives it as
red.
a. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. ? Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
c. * Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
has-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
In (31) the dubitative cannot be used although the speaker has untrusted reportative
evidence that Todor has red hair just as in (29). The only diﬀerence between the two
scenarios is that the subject, Maria, has reportative evidence in (29), but not in (31). We
conclude therefore, that rep above dub has to shift. Therefore, the subject of kaza must
have indirect evidence for the embedded proposition.
Scenario (32) shows a further subtlety: In this scenario, the speaker believes that the
subject has indirect evidence, while the subject herself believes to have direct evidence.
We found that the dubitative is acceptable in this scenario.
(32) Todor is a famous billionaire who, like Howard Hughes, few people have ever seen
and it’s not known what he looks like. Maria has never seen him, but recently she
dreamed of Todor and noticed that he had red hair. Now she thinks her dream
was reality and claims to have seen Todor with red hair, though I know it was just
a dream. However, I’m actually one of Todor’s few friends, and having seen him,
I know his hair is white.
a. ?? Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
ima
has-dir
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
b. ?? Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
imal
has-rep
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
c. Maria
Maria
kaza
said
ˇ ce
that
Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
has-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa.
hair
We conclude from the diﬀerence between (31) and (32) that the embedded rep above
dub requires that the speaker believe that the subject not have indirect evidence. This
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can be captured formally in our account by the requirement that the world argument of
rep above dub must be bound by the context binders of the matrix clause, while the
individual argument must be bound by the context binders of the embedded clause.
The following table summarizes our ﬁndings for embedding the reportative and the du-
bitative under kaza. Dir(Su,w0) indicates that the speaker knows that the subject has
indirect evidence, whereas ¬Dir(Su,w0) indicates the opposite. This captures the diﬀer-
ence between (31) and (32). For the reportative alone in the ﬁrst and second line, as we
saw in the previous section, the evidence available to the subject alone did not matter.
(33) Embedding evidentials under kaza:6
Dir(Su,w0) ¬Dir(Su,w0) Rep(Su) Rep(Su), Dbt(Su)
Dir(Sp) dir,*rep,*dub dir,*rep,*dub dir,*rep,*dub dir,*rep,*dub
Rep(Sp) ?dir,rep,*dub ?dir,rep,*dub *dir,rep,*dub *dir,rep,*dub
Rep(Sp), Dbt(Sp) dir,?rep,*dub *dir,?rep,dub *dir,?rep,dub *dir,*rep,dub
3.2 Semantics of the Dubitative
As already mentioned, we analyze the dubitative as consisting of two separate components:
rep and dub. The semantics of dub is stated in (34). This is the same as the semantics
suggested for the subjunctive in Romanian (Brasoveanu 2006).
(34) [[dub]](y,v)(p)
Presupposition: p  ⊂ Dox(y,v)
Assertion: p
Now consider the semantics of rep, ﬁrst for an umembedded occurrence of dubitative like
(35) (repeated from (27)).
(35) Todor
Todor
bil
be-rep
imal
have-dub
ˇ cervena
red
kosa
hair
‘I have reportative evidence that Todor has red hair, but I doubt that it’s true’
First assume that the reportative had the presuppositional meaning that we argue for
in section 2 in this case as well. The meaning predicted for (35) then consists of a
presupposition and an assertion: the presupposition is that the speaker does not believe
that Todor has red hair and the speaker has indirect evidence that Todor has red hair. The
assertion is that Todor has red hair. Since the assertion contradicts the presupposition,
the speaker would be asserting something he does not believe – which cannot be.
Therefore we assume that there is also the assertive lexical entry for [[rep]](y,v)(p)i n
(36):
6The scenarios not mentioned in the text are as follows:
 Dir(Sp),Rep(Su) : Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair and Maria believes her. Maria says:
“Todor imal cervena kosa.” I saw Todor’s red hair with my own eyes.
 Rep(Sp),Dir(Su) : Maria saw that Todor had red hair. She tells me on the phone: “Todor ima cervena
kosa.” I believe her.
 Rep(Sp),Rep(Su),Dbt(Su) : Milena told Maria that Todor has red hair but Maria doubts it. Maria
says: “Todor imal cervena kosa.” A close friend of mine also told me that he has seen Todor’s red hair
and I believe him.
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(36) Presupposition: –
Assertion: y has in v indirect evidence for p
Now, the predicted meaning for (27) is the following: It presupposes that the speaker
doesn’t believe that Todor has red hair, and asserts that the speaker has reportative ev-
idence that Todor has read hair. This captures the meaning of unembedded dubitative
forms correctly as far as we can see. We assume that the choice between the presuppo-
sitional and the assertive interpretation of rep is determined by context: In (27) only
the assertive interpretation can be used, because the presuppositional one is contradic-
tory. Similarly, when rep is embedded only the presuppositional interpretation can be
available: if rep was interpreted assertively in an embedded clause, but with its world ar-
gument position bound to the matrix clause w0, the embedded proposition would denote
a constant property of worlds.7
Our claim that rep can have an assertive interpretation when it occurs as part of the
dubitative straightforwardly explains the distribution of the dubitative. While in lan-
guages like Romanian the dubitative form (formally, the subjunctive B) can only be used
in embedded clauses, the Bulgarian dubitative also occurs unembedded. On our analysis
this follows from the fact that the dubitative in Bulgarian is inherently embedded under
assertive rep.
For embedded dubitatives, we have established that, on the one hand, the dubitative com-
ponent always receives a speaker-oriented interpretation, and the reportative component,
on the other hand, must be interpreted in the following way: the speaker believes that
the subject of kaza has reportative evidence.
To explain these facts, we assume that dub is subject to a binding condition that its two
arguments must be bound to the matrix context operator. Furthermore for the rep above
dub, we can conclude that its world argument must be bound to the matrix context. This
will entail that this occurrence of rep must receive a presuppositional interpretation as
we argued above. The individual argument of rep above dub, however, must be bound
to the speaker, i.e. to the context operator in the embedded clause.
These generalizations completely describe the semantics of embedding evidentials below
kaza in Bulgarian. Can we extract any more general principles from these generalizations?
While dub is always speaker-oriented, rep exhibits a more complex behavior. If we con-
sider the abstract structure in (37), the table below summarizes the binding possibilities
for rep – a *-mark indicates that a certain binding pattern is not available:
(37) λx0λw0 [M. said λxλw]T .rep( ,w0)[ dub]h a sr e dh a i r .
environment assertive? individual world
unembedded assertive, presuppositional x0 w0
umemb. with DUB assertive, *presuppositional x0 w0
embedded presuppositional, *assertive x0,* xw 0
emb. with DUB presuppositional, *assertive *x0, xw 0
The surprising fact about rep is that its individual argument position must be ﬁlled by
x0 when it does not occur above dub, but by x when its complement is headed by dub.
7We assume that world variable position in de re descriptions are ignored at this point (cf. Percus
(2000)).
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Scenario (31) shows that the fully speaker-oriented interpretation of the rep above dub is
blocked, though it should be available. This interpretation gap remains unexplained. The
non-shiftability of the plain reportative on the other hand, can plausibly be attributed to
a preference to bind both the world and the individual argument of rep from the same
position. This would be an instance of the Shift-Together constraint of Anand and Nevins
(2004). But, this constraint is violated in case of the rep that is part of the dubitative.
Hence, it would have to be a violable constraint within our analysis.
4 More embedding predicates
So far we only considered embedding of evidentials under kaza (‘say’). Other utter-
ance predicates, for example spomena (‘mention’), behave similar. But there are other
types of predicates that allow evidentials in their complements, among them predicates of
knowledge and acquisition of knowledge like znae (‘know’), sˆ anuva (‘discover’) or rezbra
(‘dream’). Of course, factive uses of sˆ anuva (‘discover’) are not compatible with the
dubitative (38c), but embedding the reportative is possible (38b).
(38) a. Marija
Maria
rezbra
discovered
ˇ ce
that
ima
is-dir
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
b. Marija
Maria
rezbra
discovered
ˇ ce
that
imalo
is-rep
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
c. * Marija
Maria
rezbra
discovered
ˇ ce
that
bilo
be-rep
imalo
is-dub
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
‘Maria discovered (found out) that there is a storm in Spain’
The reportative is even required in complements of rezbra (‘dream’), because the speaker
cannot have direct evidence for events happening in other people’s dreams (cf. (39)).
(39) a. * Marija
Maria
sˆ anuva
dreams
ˇ ce
that
ima
is-dir
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
b. Marija
Maria
sˆ anuva
dreams
ˇ ce
that
imalo
is-rep
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
‘Maria dreamed that there is a storm in Spain’
Interestingly, the reportative in complements of znae (‘know’) can be shifted: (40b) can
be used if the speaker has direct evidence for and told Maria that there is a storm in
Spain.
(40) a. Marija
Maria
znae
knows
ˇ ce
that
ima
is-dir
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
b. Marija
Maria
znae
knows
ˇ ce
that
imalo
is-rep
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
‘Maria knows that there is a storm in Spain’
Most embedding predicates seem not to allow evidentials in their complements at all.
Among the predicates we tested are propositional attitude verbs (vjerva ‘believe’, sˆ amnjava
‘doubt’, predpolaga ‘suspect’), perception predicates (ˇ cuva ‘hear’, ˇ cuvstva ‘feel’, vidja
‘see’), desiderative predicates (iska ‘want’) and pretence predicates (lˆ aˇ ze ‘lie’). This pat-
tern is illustrated in (41) for vjarva (‘believe’).
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(41) a. Marija
Maria
vjarva
believes
ˇ ce
that
ima
is-dir
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
b. * Marija
Maria
vjarva
believes
ˇ ce
that
imalo
is-rep
burja
storm
v
in
Ispanija
Spain
‘Maria believes that there is a storm in Spain’
The following table shows the pattern which verbs allow embedded evidentials in Bulgar-
ian. For comparison, we added data from three other languages from Garrett (2001) and
our own ﬁeldwork (reportative sollen in German and reportative soo-da in Japanese; the
Japanese data are preliminary).
(42) Predicates that accept evidential distinctions in their complements:
Bulgarian Tibetan German (Japanese)
say, speak ++ + +
know + − + −
think, believe − ++ −
see −− − −
5 Conclusion
Bulgarian embedding predicates diﬀer in whether they allow evidentials in their comple-
ments. Utterance predicates and predicates of knowledge allow them, while most others
do not. Unlike epistemic modals and Tibetan evidentials they usually don’t shift in em-
bedded contexts but remain speaker oriented. Under kaza (‘say’) the simple reportative
rep and the dubitative dub are never shifted, but rep above dub can shift.
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